Moral authority of juries: A forgotten aspect of citizenship by Beganyi, Mary B
UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations 
1-1-1995 
Moral authority of juries: A forgotten aspect of citizenship 
Mary B Beganyi 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds 
Repository Citation 
Beganyi, Mary B, "Moral authority of juries: A forgotten aspect of citizenship" (1995). UNLV Retrospective 
Theses & Dissertations. 525. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.25669/1kl3-i1mm 
This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV 
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the 
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from 
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself. 
 
This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu. 
INFORM ATION TO  USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI 
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some 
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may 
be from any type of computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate 
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and 
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in 
reduced form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly 
to order.
A Bell & Howell Information C om pany 
300 North Z eeb  Road. Ann Arbor. Ml 48106-1346 USA 
313/761-4700 800 /521-0600

MORAL AUTHORITY OF JURIES: 
A FORGOTTEN ASPECT OF 
CITIZENSHIP
by
MARY B. BEGANYI
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
Ethics and Policy Studies
Institute of Ethics and Policy Studies 
University of Nevada, Las V egas 
Decem ber 1995
UMI Number: 1377626
Copyright 1996 by 
Beganyi, Mary B .
All rights reserved.
UMI Microform 1377626 
Copyright 1996, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized 
copying under Title 17, United States Code.
300 North Zeeb Road 
Ann Arbor, MI 48103
©1996 Mary B. Beganyi 
All Rights Reserved
The Thesis of Mary B. Beganyi for the degree of M aster of Arts in Ethics and Policy 
Studies is approved.
Chairperson, Cra^g D. Walton, Ph.D.
Examining Committee Member,^Alan Zundel, Ph.D
Examining Committee Member, Jerry L. Simich, PH.D.
G raduate Faculty Representative, Steven Parker, PH.D.
Interim Dean of the G raduate College, Cheryl L. Bowles, Ed.D.
University of Nevada, Las V egas 
Decem ber 1995
1 1
ABSTRACT
This thesis exam ines the ethical and historical foundations for a Fully 
Informed Jury Amendment, legislation that recognizes the "nullification" power of 
the jury. The ethical discussion focuses on the dual role of the jury deliberation 
process paralleling the distinction between natural law and legalism. Hobbesian 
equity is contrasted with Aristotelian equity to further discussion of the ethical 
rationale for acknowledging a juror's duty to act according to his conscience for 
the sake of justice. The historical tradition of "trial by jury" a s  a political process 
is traced from its inception by Henry II through the present with em phasis on the 
jury's function a s  a  moral check on government. It is advocated that legal 
protection be extended to the right of citizens to exercise the "nullification" power 
in order to maintain a  highly regarded system of law based  on equity and 
founded on the moral integrity of its citizens.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The purpose cf this thesis is to determ ine if a  Fully Informed Jury 
Amendment would help individual citizens regain their position a s  a check on the 
moral authority of government.
A Fully Informed Jury Amendment would require judges to inform juries of 
their right to determ ine the law a s  well a s  the facts. Legal recognition of this 
inherent right of jurors will empower the jury to once again be the final authority 
in determining which government activities are within the law.
In order to make this determination I will: (1) establish that the trial by jury 
process is an integral part of our political heritage (Chapter 2); (2) prove that it is 
an unethical practice for the courts to disallow jurors knowledge of their power to 
act in accordance with their conscience and best sen se  of justice ("nullification") 
(Chapter 3); (3) examine argum ents for and against allowing the nullification 
instruction and the political significance of each  (Chapter 4); (4) determ ine if a 
Fully Informed Jury Amendment could restore the role of the individual citizen as 
a moral check on government activity (also Chapter 4); and (5) identify the 
educational stance  that hinders the developm ent of citizenship and the
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acquisition of the historical foundation of the Fully Informed Jury tradition 
necessary  for citizens to maintain the political order in a  free society (Chapter 5).
As for policy recommendations, the results of this investigation will 
provide me with the research necessary  to develop an educational unit on the 
trial by jury process and the importance of the individual in this process of 
maintaining a  free society. This draft unit can then be recom m ended to the 
Clark County School District. On a  personal level, this research  will provide the 
proper perspective of my role a s  a juror the next time I am called to serve.
CHAPTER TWO
HISTORY OF THE INHERENT 
POWER OF A TRIAL 
BY JURY
The purpose of this chapter is to make clear to the reader that the history
of the p rocess of trial by jury indicates that an inherent power exists within the
individual jurors to act as  a  check on the moral authority of the state  when it
moves to exert the force of law against any individual. In 1852 Lysander
Spooner so aptly stated in An Essay On The Trial By Jury:
It is also  their [the juror's] right, and their primary and param ount duty, to 
judge of the justice of the law, and to hold all laws invalid, that are, in their 
opinion, unjust or oppressive, and all persons guiltless in violating, or 
resisting the execution of, such law s1
This indirectly incorporates the process of trial by jury into the political process.
The first section of this chapter will trace the developm ent of the jury
process from its English inception into the political process by Henry II through
the American Revolution. It w as during this time period that the ethical
foundations based  on custom and tradition were laid for a  jury process inherently
capable of judging the justice of the law a s  well a s  the fact.
The second section will examine the American experience of the trial by
jury process from the American Revolution to date. This experience illustrates
that while this segm ent of the political process has been  manipulated by the
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judicial branch of the state, the inherent power of the individual serving a s  a juror 
has not yet been eradicated.
English Precedent
The philosophical foundation for the social and economic order that cam e 
to be under the Constitution of the United S ta tes is found in the "unanimous 
Declaration of the thirteen united S ta tes of America". Commonly known a s  the 
Declaration of Independence, this docum ent se t before the rest of the world the 
rationale for the separation of the colonies from G reat Britain. Logic dictates 
that the argum ent used  by the colonies to justify their separation from Britain 
must also be the argum ent used to justify any government to be established by 
these  sam e colonies.
The second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence contains the 
founding fathers' rationale for the purpose of establishing government. The 
power delegated to government originates with the citizens' Creator, who 
endows them with inalienable rights. Amongst these  are the three basic rights of 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness-the keys to securing all other rights. In 
order to secure  th ese  rights according to the laws of nature and nature's God, 
men form into community and institute government. The sole purpose of this 
government, then, is to secure th ese  inalienable rights of the individuals 
consenting to be governed. T hese individuals now have a  vested interest in the 
activities of their government and a  duty to participate in the establishm ent of the 
order in which they will abide.
The term s of the resulting contract can be inferred through custom and/or 
tradition or expressed  in a constitution. It follows then, that when government 
voids the social contract and no longer functions as  a  protector of individual 
rights--as had the government of George III-- those consenting to the 
established government must declare that breech, abolish the existing 
government, and institute a new one.
Within this "unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united S tates of 
America" is a long list of grievances which the colonists believed to be 
insufferable to the point that they determ ined "it is their right, and it is their duty, 
to throw off such government and to provide new guards for their future 
security."2 This list of grievances consisted of violations of the rights of man 
guaranteed to British subjects (colonist included) by the Magna Carta (1215) and 
by the English Declaration and Bill of Rights of 1689. The Magna Carta limited 
the kings authority and w as the first document to guarantee a  trial by a  jury of 
ones peers. The English Declaration and Bill of Rights of 1689 guaranteed 
individual rights that were considered to be "true, ancient, and indubitable rights 
and liberties of the people"3 of the English kingdom along with limiting the 
taxation powers of the king and the m aintenance of a standing army. The 
colonists' claim to th ese  rights had been established through many years of 
custom and tradition a s  British subjects.
The Declaration also s ta tes that "prudence dictates governm ents long 
established should not change for light and transient causes".4 Therefore, the 
rights and privileges of individuals being abused  and usurped by Britain must
have been held in such high esteem  by the colonists that to suffer the loss of 
these  rights w as considered by them to be unjustifiable, thereby justifying the 
revolution that w as now inevitable. It w as inevitable because  the relationship 
between the governed and the governing institution (British monarch through 
Parliament) was modified by that governing institution, to such an extent that the 
social contract no longer functioned; Britain had voided the contract.
The issues identified in the list of grievances in the Declaration of 
Independence acknowledge the three parties involved in establishing the 
recognized social order of the colonies. One party is the created state  (British 
"King in Parliament", the perpetrators of the abuses), a  second party is the 
community (the colonies, injured through economic hardships suffered by 
colonial society on the whole), and the third party is the individuals making up 
that community (citizens being deprived of individual rights without due process 
because  of the abuses). The recognition of these  three distinct political 
com ponents is important because  it recognizes the right of the individual to 
participate in politics, determining limits on government activities, and defines 
citizenship for the individual a s  the activity necessary  for creating and 
maintaining th ese  limits. That political role w as being violated, among other 
ways, by taxation without representation, and the deprivation of a trial by a juiy 
of one 's peers.
Brought into the political process by Henry II at Clarendon in 1166, trial by 
jury w as quickly assimilated into the standard English justice system. Henry's 
primary motivation was to wrest power away from the manor courts administered
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by the Barons, thereby increasing the power of the king. In order to entice 
litigants to the king's court Henry initiated what he thought to be the best justice 
system  at the time, a trial by jury—albeit the king's jury. Guinter in his book, The 
Jury in America, identifies the two singular virtues of Henry's juries.
Although Henry left no writings to explain his reasoning, we can 
infer from his other political and judicial actions at the time that he must 
have seen  that a  jury system would have two singular virtues. First, since 
it would give people the chance to help decide their own affairs, its 
p resence  w as likely to add to the popular support he w as seeking for his 
royal courts over the baronial ones: secondly, and at least a s  importantly, 
the jury would provide a  justice-dispensation method which the church 
could not readily control 5
Henry's justice system  cam e to be so highly regarded that the m onarchs of
Castile and Navarre chose to have Henry's judges settle a  border dispute for
them.
By 1215 som e two generations later trial by jury was dem anded a s  a
basic right of an Englishman when the Barons overpowered the king and forced
him to sign the M agna Carta. This docum ent limited the king's power by
recognizing the rights of an Englishman. The Magna Carta m akes mention of
trial by jury several times (chapters 10,40,52 and 39). Chapter 39, written by the
Barons in their own self-interest limited the concept of trial by jury to a  jury of
one 's peers. Chapter 39 states:
No freeman, shall be taken or/and imprisoned or d isseised or exiled or in 
any way destroyed, nor will we [the king] go upon him nor send  upon him, 
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or/and by the law of the land.6
Though written to provide for them selves a jury m ade up of barons a s  a
protection from the king, once again, the process of trial by jury w as expedient
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for political purposes but w as argued as  an entitlement for all "freemen". For the 
period of time between the close of the thirteenth century when Edward declared 
that trial by jury be considered part of the English common law and Bushel's 
c ase  in 1670, juries continued to operate under fear that the verdict they 
returned would not be acceptable to the judge who would then issue a "writ of 
attaint".
W hen a  judge or som e other royal authority disagreed with a jury verdict, 
a  writ of attaint (i.e., a  claim that the verdict was tainted) could be issued and a 
new jury of 24 summoned to reconsider the case  and try the original jurors for 
perjury rising from their "false" verdict. Should the second jury decide the first 
had done wrong-which usually m eant it decided that bribery had taken p la c e -  
the punishment meted out to the attainted jurors could be a  heavy one. As sir 
John Fortesque summarized in 1470: "All of the first jury shall be committed to 
the King's prison, their goods shall be confiscated, their possessions seized into 
the King's hands, their habitations and houses shall be pulled down, their 
woodland shall be felled, their m eadows shall be plowed up and they them selves 
forever thenceforward be esteem ed in the eye of the law infam ous7
In addition to the "writ of attaint", jurors also had to contend with the fear 
of possible prosecution in a  special court of the king known a s  the Court of Star 
Chamber. Initiated in 1487 this special court claimed exclusive jurisdiction over 
felonies such a s  forgery, perjury, rioting, fraud, libel, conspiracy and political 
crimes. Jurors who decided against the Crown often found them selves being 
indicted in the Court of Star C ham ber-no t under British law, but by methods 
similar to the Spanish Inquisition.8
After losing a  bout with the crown as  to the superiority of the Common 
P leas courts (common law) over the Chancery courts, Sir Edward Coke (1552- 
1634), the most highly regarded common law jurist, gave up his position on the
Common P leas bench in order to be elected to Parliament. O nce elected he
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facilitated the elimination of the Court of the Star Chamber. This sam e 
Parliament then resurrected the Magna Carta a s  a  guarantor of the rights of all 
Englishmen, and declared that Parliament be the lawmaking body superior to 
both common law and Chancery (equity) courts. While Edward Coke 
cham pioned the Common Law his motive here had more to do with vengeance 
for the decision m ade by Sir Francis Bacon to place the Chancery Courts over 
the  Common P leas Courts rather than building the  foundation of individual moral 
authority through the jury process. However, this later consequence w as soon to 
happen.
The catalyst for the final change in the jury p rocess began with the arrest 
of a  young man by the nam e of William Penn and his companion C harles Mead 
under the Conventicle Act. The Conventicle Act (1660) w as intended to provide 
speedy  rem edies for any seditious action; particularly any action involving what 
could be construed a s  insurrection against the Church of England. Penn and 
Mead, both Quakers, were accused  under this law of "seditiously" causing a 
tumult. Prosecution under statutory law, the Conventicle Act, would result in a 
fine which both young men could easily afford; prosecution under the "common 
law" of unlawful assem bly could lead to jail sen ten ces .9 N eedless to say  the 
young men were to be tried under common law. However, the way in which the 
charge w as written m ade it evident that it w as the Conventicle Act under which 
they were being tried.
After hearing the evidence-testim ony of three men who claimed to have 
seen  Penn preaching but were too far away to hear what he w as saying--the jury
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w as given their charge. After 90 minutes the jury stood eight to four for 
conviction. Edward Bushel upon being recognized by an alderm an a s  one of the 
possible holdouts received this admonishment: "You deserve to be indicted more 
than any man that hath been brought to the bar this day." The judge then added 
the threat of branding the recalcitrant jurors.10
W hen the jury returned from further consideration it returned with one 
verdict:
William Penn, they said w as "guilty of speaking in G racechurch Street." 
That w as not what the judges wanted to hear. They couldn't send anyone 
to prison for that. "Was it not an unlawful assem bly?" dem anded the 
judge. "You m ean he w as speaking to a  tumult of people there."
The foreman of the jury replied: "My Lord, this w as all I had in 
commission."11
Disregarding further threats of detainm ent and starvation this jury
continued to find Penn and Mead not guilty. Unable to force a  verdict the judge
returned Penn and Mead to their jail cells and fined each of the twelve jurors 40
marks. W hen the jurors refused to pay they also were imprisoned. It w as 1670
and these  twelve jurors were about to put the "writ of attaint" to rest. C ast into
Newgate Prison, eight of the twelve jurors eventually paid their fines and were
released. The remaining four retained lawyers to argue their c a se  (Bushel's
Case). After a  year of litigation the fining and imprisonment of this jury was
declared illegal. More importantly, however, w as the finding by the Chief Justice
that no jury can be punished for its verdict.
Bushel and his colleagues--m en otherwise anonym ous but 
distinguished in the history of freedom -had  m ade it possible
for all juries that cam e after them to render their verdicts 
without fear and a s  they, not the judge, saw  the equities.
The jury of one's peers that the barons had provided had at 
last becom e what the barons never wanted it to be, a 
democratic parliament of twelve.12
Bushel's C ase is important in itself for the role it played in eliminating the 
"writ of attaint". W hen coupled with the litigation which called this jury into 
being, the importance is magnified. By not rendering the verdict called for by the 
court this jury took on the moral authority to determine that the law ,the 
Conventicle Act, under which Penn and Mead were being prosecuted did not 
apply in this case.
As the English colonies were established in North America their charters 
and governing docum ents provided for the right to trial by jury. The First Charter 
of Virginia (1606) extended the rights of an English subject to the colonists. King 
Jam es I's Instruction for the Government of the Colony of Virginia specifically 
mentioned the right to a  jury trial.13
The American Experience 
By the time of the American Revolution the process of trial by jury in the 
colonies had evolved to enable the jurors to judge the law as  well a s  the facts. 14 
This right w as granted to jurors in M assachusetts in 1641, repealed and 
regranted by enactm ents in 1642, 1657, and 1660.15 The oath administered to 
jurors in M assachusetts incorporated instructions cautioning them to deliver their 
verdict "according to law and the evidence given you."16
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In cases  decided in 1692, 1764, 1767 and 1773 in Pennsylvania, it was 
held that jurors had this right to determine both law and fact.17 A review of cases  
that were argued in Pennsylvania in 1784 found opposing counsel argued 
different law and the jury w as charged to make up its own mind as  to which w as 
correct.18 There w as only one judge in the United S tates between 1776 and 1800 
that denied juries the right to decide law a s  well a s  fact. He was afterward 
im peached by the House of Representatives of Pennsylvania and removed by 
the Pennsylvania S en a te .19 In 1790 Pennsylvania provided by constitutional 
provision that "in all indictments for libels the jury shall have a right to determ ine 
the law and the facts under the direction of the court, a s  in other cases."20 The 
duty of the jury resulting from this direction to determ ine the law and the facts is 
to determ ine the applicability of the law in light of the facts specific to the case.
Often the jury becam e aw are of their right to determ ine both law and fact 
indirectly a s  was the case  in the John Peter Z enger trial (1735). In this case  
jurors were informed of their right to decide the law a s  well as  the facts through 
closing arguments. Zenger, a New York new spaper printer, was charged with 
libel against the royal governor of New York. The judge m ade it clear that the 
jurors could only decide the facts; in this case  that am ounted to whether or not 
Zenger did in fact print the article. It was to be a  simple case  with the jury 
returning a verdict for the king. However, Zenger's attorney argued that if the 
story w as true then the words could not be held libelous. The presiding judge 
positioned himself by stating that "a libel is not to be justified; for it is 
nevertheless a libel that it is true"21; reserving the right to decide the law a s  to
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what constitutes libel to himself. In the closing argum ents Zenger's lawyer, 
Andrew Hamilton p ressed  the jury to determ ine the truth of the facts presented.
The chief justice interrupted Hamilton's closing argum ent reminding him 
that the jury:
"May find that Mr. Zenger printed and published those papers, and leave 
it to the court to judge whether they are  libelous. You know this is very 
common; it is in the nature of a special verdict, where the jury leave the 
matter of law to the Court."
Hamilton's reply to the judge at this point informed Zenger's jurors of their
right to determ ine the law.
"I know, may it p lease  your honour, they may do so; 
but I do likewise know they may do otherwise. I know they 
have the right, beyond all dispute, to determ ine both the law 
and the fact, and where they have no doubt of the law, they 
ought to do so....
Hamilton continued to the jury:
"A proper confidence in a court is com endable; but the verdict (whatever it 
is) will be yours, you ought to refer to part of your duty to the discretion of 
th ese  persons. If you should be of opinion that there is no falsehood in 
Mr. Z enger's papers, you will, nay (pardon me for the expression) you 
ought to say so.... It is the best cause; it is the cause  of liberty."22 
W hen the jury returned with a  not guilty verdict it w as much more than a
victory for freedom of the press. Zenger's trial set precedent for the jury's right
to nullify law since the judge did not stop Hamilton from arguing the question
even though he did not concede to the right.
Thus, trial by jury w as recognized by the founding fathers a s  something
more than a m ere judicial process. It w as understood to be the process by which
individuals maintained the public morality through exertion of their moral
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authority (the original power of the individual to establish government) in 
determining what actions of government w ere to be considered lawful.
The colonist could not be m ade to suffer the hardships put on them by 
Britain through various legislation as  long a s  they maintained their individual 
rights; for no jury would convict anyone tried under those laws. Guinther (1988) 
notes the importance of the trial by jury a s  a political power betw een 1764 and 
1776:
A denial of the right to jury helped force that revolution into 
existence. The stage w as set through the passag e  by Parliament of the 
Stamp Act of 1764, a tax on paper that w as considered a  form of 
censorship by many new spaper publishers. It proved difficult to enforce. 
To gain convictions of violators, the British government switched 
prosecutions under the statute from the Common P leas to the Admiralty 
courts where, a s  in Chancery,juries--which would have freed the Stamp 
Act pro testo rs-w ere not permitted. The Stamp Act Congress, held in 
New York in 1765, specifically condem ned this abrogation of the jury trial, 
but Parliament, at least initially, w as unim pressed by the complaints.23
According to Scheflin and Van Dyke (1980) juries for much of the
seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries were frequently told that they
had the right and power to reject the judge's view of the law.24 Howe (1939)
observes that in the period soon after the constitutional convention juries had
the right to determ ine both law and fact. Rules of evidence were either loose or
nonexistent, and the control of the judge over courtroom procedure w as
apparently limited to preventing m ayhem .25 Provine (1986) provides one
rationale for such jury power; that is, very little distinguished the lay jurors from
the equally lay judge.26
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The newly formed U.S. Supreme Court se t impressive legal precedents
defining the jury's power. Georgia v. Brailsford (1794), a civil case  being heard
under the original jurisdiction of the Suprem e Court, se t precedent when Chief
Justice John Jay sitting a s  a  trial judge advised the jury that they should take the
law from the court:
"But it must be observed that by the sam e law, which 
recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you 
have, nevertheless, a  right to take upon yourselves to judge 
of both, and to determ ine the law a s  well a s  the fact in 
controversy."27
Bingham v. Cabot (1794) drew a similar opinion of the jury's power
from justices Jam es Iredell and Jam es W ilson.28 This principle of
jury justice w as adhered to whenever prosecution for seditious libel
under the Sedition Law of 1798 cam e before the courts.
The broad support shown for the juries' right to decide law
and fact in the late 1700's continued into the nineteenth century. In
M assachusetts a s  late a s  1829,
the jury w as thought to be a  partner in a  joint enterprise with 
the judge, with respect to determinations of law and fact; 
judge-jury co-operation w as the rule in both a reas .29 
Succinctly put in Commonwealth v. Childs (1829), "the law
presum es intelligence in the jury."30
However, a s  the nineteenth century progressed, the juries'
right to consider the equities of the law gradually eroded. Horowitz
and Wellging (1991) attribute this to the increasing professionalism
of jurists, and the courts' reaction to the muzzling of trial judges at
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the turn of the 19th century.31 The direct and special verdicts a s
well a s  the special interrogatories were judicially developed to
curtail the juries' power to decide questions of law.32 Evidence of
such developm ent can be found in the M assachusetts c ase s  of
Commonwealth v. Porter (1845) and C hase v. Breed (1855),
culminating in Commonwealth v. Merrill (1860).33
The first attack on the juries' power cam e in 1845. In
Commonwealth v. Porter (1845) Chief Justice Shaw argues that:
"The constitutional guarantee of a  trial before an impartial judge under 
standing laws would be violated if the jury were allowed to decide 
questions of law."34
C hase v. Breed (1855) and Commonwealth v. Packard (1855) both suggest a 
move toward the directed verdict.35 Finally, in Commonwealth v. Merrill (1860) 
"the court held for the first time that a  directed verdict is mandatory when the 
evidence is legally insufficient."36 The courts decision to uphold the use of 
directed verdicts led to the M assachusetts legislature adopting a  statute that 
explicitly gave juries the power to determ ine both the law and fact.
The concept of natural justice which prevailed in the first half of the 
century w as the foundation for the argum ents against the directed verdict. The 
legislature's argum ents that the jury had the right to decide law included two 
positions. The first position being that the jury could respond to a  higher law 
which would allow the jury to reach its conclusion of the basis of natural law 
considered to be more truly just. The second position being that the jury is 
qualified to determine the contents of the positive law, using the relatively simple
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and understandable common law which is closely related in principle to the 
natural law.37 The state  of Indiana also adopted a similar statute at this time.
Scheflin and Van Dyke (1980) attribute the curtailment of jury rights to the 
notion that leading judges did not think that a jury could be permitted to mitigate 
the law without also being able to create harsh and vindictive laws.38 Scheflin 
and Van Dyke illustrate their point by citing United S tates v. Battiste (1835).
This case  concerns the application of an 1820 statute that provided the death 
penalty for any American citizen who should "seize any negro or mulatto" with 
the intent of making the person a slave. The defendant had been a  sailor on a 
ship that transported slaves from Portuguese Africa. Two questions of 
interpretation of the law had to be resolved: (1) whether the statute applied to 
sailors who gained no title over slaves and no profit from their sale; and (2) 
whether it applied to the transportation of slaves between two points within a 
country practicing slavery. Suprem e Court Justice, Joseph Story, sitting a s  the 
presiding trial judge answ ered both questions with a  "no". His concern in limiting 
the jurors to his interpretation of the law and to decide the facts only w as that he 
did not want the jurors to convict the defendant for an act that the legislature did 
not intend to criminalize. While Justice Story's position runs contrary to the 
power of juries determining the law, it is in fact congruent with the spirit of the 
nullification issue; that the nullification power be used whenever the jury has an 
inclination to show mercy.39 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 led to direct 
confrontation in the issue of jury independence. The Fugitive Slave Act was
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difficult to enforce because  so many people were opposed to the law that juries
habitually acquitted in c ases  of obvious violation. In United S tates v. Morris
(1851) Justice Benjamin R. Curtis, presiding trial judge, disallowed the counsel
for the defendant to argue that if the jurors:
Conscientiously believed the Fugitive Slave Act to be unconstitutional 
then they w ere bound by their oath to disregard any direction to the 
contrary which the court might give them.
Curtis concluded that:
The jury have the power to go contrary to the law a s  decided by the court; 
but that power is not the right, is plain, when we consider that they also 
have the like power to go contrary to the evidence, which they are sworn 
not to do.40
Justice Curtis continues by explaining that if jurors w ere permitted to 
decide questions of law, then they could overturn decisions of the Supreme 
Court. The purpose of the 1802 statute (which m akes Suprem e Court decisions 
final) would be subverted and uniform interpretation of the law would be 
impossible.41
The decisions m ade individually by Justices Story and Curtis were used
extensively when the question of what jurors should be told about their power
cam e before the Suprem e Court in 1895. The jurors for Sparf and Hansen v. the
United S tates (1895) were trying to discern if they could find the men guilty of
m anslaughter rather than murder even though there w as no evidence to sustain
that charge. In response to the jury's request for additional instructions to be
given by the judge the court stated  that:
In a  proper case, the verdict for m anslaughter may be rendered,... and 
even in this case  you have the physical power to do so; but a s  one of the
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tribunals of the country, a  jury is expected to be governed by law, and the law it 
should receive from the court.42
The defendants appealed  to the Suprem e Court arguing that the jury had been 
improperly instructed. The Suprem e Court clearly decided that jurors must take 
the law from the judge and may not substitute their own beliefs of what the law 
should be. However, they did not address the specific question whether jurors 
should be told they can refuse to enforce the law's harshness when justice so
43requires.
The courts continued to consistently recognize the power the jury held in
determining c ase s  according to conscience-nullifying law -but the issue of what
to tell the jury concerning this power remained moot until the latter half of the
twentieth century. The high acquittal rate in prohibition cases  during the 1920's
and 1930's w as a good indication that prohibition laws could not be enforced.
According to Scheflin the repeal of those laws can be traced to the power of the
juries to refuse to convict those accused of alcohol traffic even when the
defendant appeared  to be guilty.44 In 1949 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit noted,
The jury has always exercised the pardoning power, notwithstanding the 
law, which is their actual prerogative.45
Understanding this jury's power to nullify and its decision not to in this case,
provided further support for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to uphold the
conviction.46 By the 1960's however, when the Department of Justice decided
to move against political activists (Vietnam war protestors) the issue of the jury's
right to be informed of their power to decide the case  based  on conscience was
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no longer moot. The forum for the debate  w as United S ta tes v. Dougherty 
(1972). This case  involved nine m em bers of the Catholic clergy who broke into 
Dow Chemical Company offices and ransacked the prem ises to protest Dow's 
manufacture of napalm. The defendants requested a  jury nullification instruction 
at the trial but the request was refused. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
upheld, by a  two-to-one vote, the trial judge's refusal to give the nullification 
instruction.47
Judge Harold Leventhal writing for the majority asserted  that jurors know 
of their prerogative to decide the c ase  based  on conscience through "informal 
communication from the total culture" (sources such a s  television, literature, 
new spapers etc.).48 He feared that if jurors were told of their power to nullify, 
they may react and thereby radically upset an institution that functioned best 
when functioning informally. Chief Judge David Bazelon wrote the dissenting 
opinion, condemning the inconsistent view that glorifies nullification as  
enhancing the "over-all normative effect of the rule of law",49 while requiring that 
the nullification power be concealed from jurors and perhaps even denounced in 
their p resence--as had been done in Dougherty.50 It is interesting to note that the 
nullification defense w as allowed four years later when twenty-eight Vietnam 
W ar protestors went on trial in Camden, New Jersey for destroying draft records. 
All twenty-eight were acquitted even though the FBI caught them inside the draft 
offices destroying records. Today the right of the jury to act as  a  check on the 
state exists a s  it did two hundred years ago. The individual juror has the 
inherent power and duty as  an individual to determine the justice of the law as
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well a s  the facts. However, the manipulation of this power by the judicial system, 
coupled with decreasing knowledge of our unique political heritage has left the 
citizen ignorant of his status in the political a rena  with respect to carrying out his 
duties as  a juror.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ETHICS OF 
THE JURY NULLIFICATION 
INSTRUCTION
As we traced the history of the trial by jury process in chapter two from its 
English origins through the American experience we found that the trial by jury 
process has always played a  political function in the administration of the law. 
Both the U.S. S enate  and the U.S. House of Representatives in separa te  
committee reports prior to the approval of the Federal Jury Selection Act of 1968 
articulated their recognition of the political function of the trial by jury process: "it 
must be rem em bered that the jury is designed not only to understand the case, 
but also to reflect the community's sen se  of injustice in deciding it".1
The goal of this chapter is to determine if it is an  ethical practice for the 
courts, who recognize the political function of the trial by jury process, to 
disallow jurors knowledge of their power to act a s  moral agen ts in checking 
government activity through the nullification power of the jury, "the right of jurors 
to refuse to enforce the law against defendants whom they believe in good 
conscience should be acquitted".2 The nullification power of the jury "empowers 
jurors to appeal to fundamental principles of justice over and above the written 
law."3 A juror knowledgeable about this right is referred to a s  a  "fully informed
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juror". A "Fully Informed Jury Amendment" (FIJA) would make it mandatory for 
judges to include information about this jury right in their instructions to the jury.
I plan to meet this goal by examining the dual role of the trial by jury 
process through Hobbes's use  of the terms “justice” and “equity” a s  the basis of 
his political arena. A distinction between law and legalism will be m ade and 
their relationship to justice and equity will be established. The relationship 
between the individual citizen and the concepts of law and legalism, equity and 
justice will be drawn to indicate that the individual citizen bound by the principles 
of equity and lawfulness, is the originator of the law and therefore the only moral 
authority capable of determining equity and dispensing justice. The subordinate 
position of the state  in relation to the people within the political order will be the 
final prem ise in support of my conclusion, that any state  preventing individual 
citizens from using their inherent capacity to reason and act equitably, acts in an 
unethical manner. Therefore it is an unethical practice not to acknowledge a 
juror's right to act according to conscience. Prohibiting the nullification 
instruction prevents a  juror from acting in accordance with his/her moral 
prerogative.
Dual Function of the Trial by Jury Process 
The e ssen ce  of the dual nature of the trial by jury process is to 
simultaneously serve both justice and equity. In order to do this the jury 
simultaneously creates two distinct objectives, one which I shall refer to a s  the
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'justice objective’ is maintained on an individual basis and the other, which I shall 
refer to as  the ‘equity objective’ is maintained on a societal level.
The political function of the jury serving the 'justice objective’ is to 
determine if an individual member of society has maintained the legalities of the 
law. The specifics of the case  a s  to the truth and probability of evidence are 
examined and if one or more acts by the accused  are  found to be outside of the 
param eters of what the conscience of the community accepts a s  docum ented in 
written law, then, it is the duty of the jury to determine that violation and what 
degree of punishment should be used against the individual.
The political function of the jury serving the ‘equity objective’ is to 
determ ine if the positive law (law that is established and recognized by 
governmental authority) a s  interpreted by the officials of the state, reflects the 
natural law a s  interpreted by the citizens of the community. Every time a  jury 
acts upon a  specific set of circum stances it evaluates the soundness of the 
positive law a s  an expression of the natural law, establishing the param eters of 
what the community determ ines to be lawful in that circumstance.
Citizens cannot be released from the political duties of the jury due to the 
self-legislating nature of equity and lawfulness. Equity and lawfulness are self- 
legislating in the sen se  that both equity and lawfulness in and of them selves 
obligate one to a course of action that must be maintained in order for equity and 
lawfulness to exists. It is this nature that binds citizens to a course of action that 
neither judicial policy nor legislation can eliminate. Socrates reminds his jurors
28
that they have this obligation to determine both law (including the legal) and
equity (including justice) when he states:
The jury does not sit to d ispense justice a s  a  favour, but to decide where 
justice lies; and the oath which they have sworn is not to show favour at 
their own discretion, but to return a just and lawful verdict. It follows that 
we must not develop in you, nor you allow to grow in yourselves, the habit 
of perjury; that would be sinful for us both...I leave it to you and to God to 
judge me as  it shall be best for me and for yourselves.4
Socrates' appeal to his jurors to avoid perjuring them selves while
deliberating his fate implies that they have a duty to act according to a higher
law and that to stray from that course of action that higher law se ts  out for them
com prom ises their integrity. Socrates entrusts his jurors and God to judge him
with equity--"as it shall be best for me and for yourselves."5
The Self-Legislating Nature of Equity,
Justice, Lawfulness and Legality
W ebster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines lawfulness a s  that
which is "constituted, authorized, or established by law (natural, divine, common
or canon)". It distinguishes lawfulness from legal within its definition, stating that
"legal” applies to what is sanctioned by the law or in conformity with the law,
especially a s  it is written or adm inistered by the courts."
Natural law, a s  defined by Cicero, is what individuals arrive at as  a  result
of the "highest reasoning".
Law (lex) is the highest reason, fixed in nature, which commands what is 
to be done, and prohibits the opposite. That reason, when it is 
established and fulfilled in the mind of man, is law. Accordingly they think 
that law is the wisdom w hose force would lie in commanding to act rightly 
and forbidding to do wrong.
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Since nothing is better than reason, and since it is both in man and in 
God, the fellowship of reason is the first thing man sh ares  with God. But 
those who share  reason also share  a  common right reason. And since 
the latter is law, we must suppose that men are associated  with the gods 
also in law. Furthermore, those who have a community of law (lex), have 
also a  community of right (ius); and those who have th ese  things in 
common, are to be held as  of the sam e State. And it is much more so if in 
fact they obey the sam e authority and powers; but they do obey this 
heavenly order and divine mind of god of superior power; so that this 
whole world is to be regarded a s  one common State of gods and men.6
Cicero identifies reason a s  a divine part of the nature of man; man being
subjected to the divine authority then, is also  subjected to his reason, which
each of us share  with others and with the gods.
It is, however, in his De Legibus that Cicero makes his distinctive 
contribution. Identifying "right reason" with those qualities of human 
nature whereby "man is associated  with the gods," he there assigns the 
binding quality of the civil law itself to its being in harmony with such 
universal attributes of human nature. In the natural endowm ent of man, 
and especially his social traits, "is to be found the true source of laws and 
rights," he asserts, and later says, "We are  born for justice and right is not 
the m ere arbitrary construction of opinion, but an institution of nature." 
Hence justice is not, as  the Epicureans claim, mere utility, for "that which 
is established on account of utility may for utilities sake  be overturned." 
There is, in short, discoverable in the perm anent elem ents of human 
nature itself a  durable justice which transcends expediency, and the 
positive law must embody this if it is to claim the allegiance of the human 
conscience.7
Corwin recognized the relationship established between reason and the 
"supreme power" a s  the source of "higher law" for American constitutional law 
(positive law). He credits Cicero for recognizing the self-legislating (directing a 
course of action necessary  to maintain in order for existence) aspect of natural 
law based  not only on its connection to the divine, but also on the divine’s 
reflection in man. This reflection is the e sse n ce  of justice in human nature. 
Justice is neither arbitrary nor expendable, it is a  perm anent natural right of man
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providing the binding qualities of civil law. In other words, justice requires a 
certain course of action be taken by man if justice is to exist.
The translators of Cicero use  the term ‘positive law' to describe the 
embodiment of right reasoning in written form for all to know. Hobbes u ses  the 
term "artificial law" to describe this sam e concept of written law embodying 
"natural law".
As Cicero m ade a divine connection in order to align positive and natural 
law on a  moral spectrum for the Hellenistic philosophers, Hobbes does so for the 
R enaissance and early modern philosophers. Art to them w as "God's way in 
nature, and therefore, it [the artificial] is m an's way to build within nature so a s  to 
bring natural beginnings to their best possible fruition by admixture of m an's 
labor and skill."8 The em phasis on the skill and labor in the making of the 
artificial is important. The artificial thing is not m ade lightly a s  a substitute for 
the natural, but m eant to reflect the natural a s  purely a s  possible within the 
nature of that by which it is made. Artificial law is crafted with language and will 
only be a s  effective a s  the language allows.
Hobbes, like the classical philosophers, recognizes two types of law, 
natural and artificial. Natural laws or lawfulness, a re  really "theorems" of natural 
reason  which we seek  in order to live in peace and becom e individuals 
(technically they are not law until acted upon in a  public m anner).9
Artificial law or legalism, by comparison, is the result of men coming 
together in covenant and creating an artificial entity, the public. This public 
requires an artificial person to act a s  its agent, taking on all the capacities of a
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real person including that of right reasoning i.e. public logic.10 It is the duty of 
this public person then, to state what is the public logic i.e., "how we agree to 
use  words in conversation (c)[and] must include agreem ent about good and evil 
on those m atters which make and dissolve fundamental social bonds. Privileged 
definitions or u sag es  cannot be allowed in these  matters."11 Artificial law should 
reflect the natural law to the extent of the public logic. Artificial law can becom e 
obsolete a s  the public logic develops or it can becom e broader and more 
encom passing or narrower and more limiting a s  the language changes.
Therefore a need  exists for constant checking to ensure that the artificial does in 
fact reflect the natural.
Lawfulness and legalism, the real and the artificial are  dual guideposts to 
m an's interactions. Lawfulness is based  on m an's ability to reason that whatever 
is good for himself is also good for others. He extends to others those rights he 
wishes to claim for himself when he en ters into a  social covenant (society): "we 
dem and no right against others we do not grant others against us"12.
Lawfulness according to Hobbes is adhered  to because  of its equitable 
nature founded in reason. H obbes's u se  of the term "equity" w as unique in that it 
transformed the classical definition of fairness and equality in business dealings 
resulting from som e other moral prerogative to being a moral prerogative in 
itself. For Hobbes equity w as no longer merely a  remedy for an injustice; equity 
becam e the reason  for just actions and subsequently the foundation for 
lawfulness and legalism.
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For Hobbes and Aristotle a s  for many others equity is that to which 
appeal is m ade in the interpretation or "correction” or supplementing of 
the letter of the law. That to which appeal is m ade in equity has, 
however, becom e a  very different thing for Hobbes. As we have seen  
Aristotelian equity is a correction of the just a s  the lawful which seeks to 
do a s  the lawgiver himself would have done were he faced with the 
circum stances under which the law he devised now operates.... For 
Hobbes, on the other hand, equity is at once that to which appeal is m ade 
in the interpretation of the laws, a  standard for the performance of the 
sovereign's office, and 'that habit by which we allow equality of nature’.
As the interpreter of law is allowed or even required to suppose always 
that the legislator intended equity, the appeal to equity becom es an 
appeal to what has been  called 'natural public law'. Equity is no m ere 
“complement” or perfection of the just a s  the lawful; it is rather the very 
foundation of justice a s  the lawful.13
Classical Aristotelian equity is "a correction to legal justice" when the 
"error w as not in the law or the legislator but in the nature of the thing".14 
Classical equity w as called upon when the legal justice system  failed in specific 
situations due to the universality of the law. Equity in the Aristotelian sen se  is 
not a  standard in itself but a  tool allowing for the correction of artificial or legal 
justice in order to achieve natural justice which is the mandating standard. One 
classical example of Aristotelian equity is the "grandfather clause", a  clause 
creating an exemption based  on circum stances previously existing.
In contrast to Aristotelian equity, Hobbesian equity is a moral standard in 
itself and becom es the foundation for lawfulness and subsequently legalism. 
Hobbes saw  equity in a  way which w as inconsistent with common law (which 
relied on classical equity to repair injustices). But th ese  injustices would never 
have occurred under law founded upon Hobbesian equity. Mathie sum m arizes 
H obbes's concept of equity in relation to the common law a s  follows:
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As unwritten law can be nothing other than the law of nature as  
determined by reason or equity, no custom or presumption in law can 
establish a s  law whatever is contrary to equity.15
Hobbesian equity generates justice, lawfulness and that which is legal.
Aristotelian equity is something in addition to that which is legal in order to
achieve an equitable result-justice a s  prescribed by the law.
It [equity] is not better than justice in the sen se  that it belongs to a 
different and better genus than justice. The just thing to which the 
equitable thing is superior, is the lawfully just thing, i.e. the equitable thing 
is better than that which is just a s  being in accord with the law.16 
[em phasis added]
Legalism is the result of men coming together in equity to institutionalize 
through the written word the conditions under which they relinquish their rights 
for the sake of living in peace. Legalism estab lishes the param eters by which 
individuals refuse to allow society to infringe upon the liberties they have as 
individuals. Written law is expected to be adhered  to based  on the principles of 
justice--that all parties (real and artificial) concerned agree to the term s set forth.
Since both parties, be they real or artificial (such a s  the state), know the terms
of the written law there is no reason not to abide by the law other than to
perpetrate an injustice:
for 'injustice is no other than the not perform ance of covenant. And 
w hatsoever is not unjust is just1.17
Taking those qualities which are instinctual, primitive and natural for man and 
making them artificial [legal] through the process of right reasoning should make 
those qualities better or near perfect. Therefore, that which w as m ade artificial
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through the process of public logic should be adhered to by the public since 
they, the public, are  the cause .18
It w as according to Hobbes the mistake of Aristotle to make natural 
inequality a  foundation of his political science; whether men are equal by 
nature or not they must be acknowledged such, a s  they are within 
H obbes's own political teaching. Equity a s  the habit of acknowledging 
this natural equality, or demanding a s  one 's own right only what one will 
admit to be the right of others, becom es the fundamental moral virtue, a 
rule for the guidance of public policy, and a powerful instrument for the 
interpretation of law.19
Since Aristotle's politics is not based  on equality he must constantly 
remedy the laws and decisions on an as-needed  basis according to privilege 
and rank in the community in order to achieve equity. Hobbes estab lishes his 
politics on equality disallowing for rank and privilege therefore his equity is a 
standard in itself.
The nature of equity and law a s  well a s  the origins of legalism and justice 
provide individual citizens with two political obligations, both of which can be 
fulfilled a s  part of the jury deliberations in the trial by jury process. One is to 
make certain that the written law is adhered  to in the nam e of justice (Aristotle's 
"distributive justice"). The other is constantly to check that the written law does in 
fact reflect natural law a s  it is understood by the community (in the nam e of 
Hobbesian equity). Determining both the law and the facts in th ese  ways is what 
a  "Fully Informed Jury Amendment" would require a  sitting jury to do, for it 
allows citizens to exercise their right and fulfill their obligation to perform these  
two checks on the law. It is the nature of equity and law and the origins of
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legalism and justice in that nature that gives man the right to act a s  the moral 
authority in guiding the government.
The Final Premise 
The United S tates w as established by people who held the moral 
prerogative of universal equity in the Hobbesian sense: and a  belief in the rights 
of the individual to extend only so far a s  he grants his neighbor the sam e rights.
In order to ensure their rights the people established an artificial entity, the state, 
to administer the aspects of living in unity. However, they reserved for 
them selves the administration of the law through the republican form of 
government, and the reservation of the right to a trial by jury in order to have the 
final say  in all state  activity.
The United S tates w as brought into existence according to this sequence  
as  evidenced in the Pream ble to the Constitution. The em phasis of the Pream ble 
is that the state  is subordinate to the people.
W e the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect 
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the 
common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure  the blessings 
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this 
Constitution for the United S ta tes of America.20
Article III, Section II, Paragraph III of the Constitution guaranteed the right 
of trial by jury to the people. Many people feared losing this right to trial by jury 
and actively cam paigned against the adoption of the Constitution unless a  Bill of 
Rights stating the rights of the individual in the political order being established 
by the Constitution was included. Patrick Henry, who years earlier spoke
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impassionately in favor of independence, spoke candidly about his fears of
losing the right to trial by jury.
But, Sir, I have strong cause  of apprehension: In som e parts of the plan 
before you, the great rights of freem en are endangered, in other parts 
absolutely taken away. How does your trial by jury s tand? In civil cases  
g o n e -n o t sufficiently secured in crim inal-this best privilege is gone: But 
we are told that we need not fear, because  those in power being our 
R epresentatives, will not abuse  the powers we put in their hands: I am not 
well versed in history, but I will submit to your recollection, whether liberty 
had been  destroyed most often by the licentiousness of the people, or by 
the tyranny of rulers.21
Henry, along with the many others, dem anded that the Constitution be further
defined in order to protect this "best privilege". This was accom plished in the
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments of the Bill of Rights.
W hat m ade the right to trial by jury a  "best privilege" w as the tradition of
jurors being allowed to determine the law a s  well a s  the facts (exactly what a
Fully Informed Jury Act would g u aran tee )-th e  right to nullify law in certain
circum stances. This power, to check whether state  activity w as consistent with
the law, is what Alexander Hamilton referred to when he called the right to trial
by jury "the very palladium of free government".22 This sam e power is referred to
today as  the power of "jury nullification".
"The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they 
agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial 
by jury; or if there is any difference betw een them it consists in this: the 
former regard it a s  a  valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it 
a s  the very palladium of free government."23
The status of the state  as  being subordinate to the people in the political 
order established by the Constitution is critical to the argument in support of 
FIJA because  a  state  w hose existence is subordinate to the people, a s  the
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United S tates is, has no authority to limit or influence the decision making
process of the people a s  individuals or collectively a s  "the public”. In a free
society based  on equity no one individual or state has privilege over another.
The moral prerogative upon which the law of the United States is 
based  is grounded in Hobbesian equity. This is critical to the argument in 
support of FIJA. Thom as Jefferson, writing for the founding fathers, 
explains this equity in terms of the universal equality of individuals as  to 
their inalienable rights. T hese rights are the sam e ones Hobbes 
ascertains as  the first two laws of nature in Leviathan stemming from the 
basic right "jus naturale", the liberty each man hath, to use  his own power, 
a s  he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of 
his own life;24
Hobbes first law of nature is:
that every man has right to every thing;
and his second law of nature is:
that a  man be willing, when others are so too, a s  far-forth, a s  for peace, 
and defence of himself he  shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to 
all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, a s  he 
would allow other men against himself.25
T hese  sam e Hobbesian laws are re-iterated by Jefferson with these
words:
W e hold these  truths to be self-evident, that all men are  created 
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable 
rights; that among these, are  life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
That to secure  these  rights, governm ents are instituted am ong men, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.26
A detailed comparison betw een John Locke and Thom as Hobbes is 
outside the scope of this thesis, although an explanation is in order to justify 
attributing Jefferson's concept of universal equality a s  stated  in the Declaration 
of Independence to Hobbes rather than Locke. Traditionally we associate
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Jefferson's words with Locke rather than Hobbes. As Hartz stated, "a society 
which begins with Locke, and thus transforms him, stays with Locke, by virtue of 
an absolute and irrational attachm ent it develops for him".27 Jefferson's thoughts 
on m an's moral nature are considered eclectic in that he includes Stoic,
Christian, humanist, deist, Epicurean, utilitarian, agrarian, Enlightenment, social 
contract, and natural rights concepts.28
Peter Laslett in his introduction to the 1988 edition of the Two Treatises of 
Government credits Locke with providing the political policy that Hobbes' 
Leviathan lacked.
It [Two T reatises of Government] contained just that ingredient 
which Leviathan lacked-policy; statem ent of guidance of what men will 
accept, respond to and pursue, allowance for the limits of their loyalty and 
for the limits on possible generalization about their behaviour. But Locke 
"on Government” w as also the presentation of a  cogitated case, a piece of 
intellectual persuasion, from a mind with a great deal in common with that 
of Hobbes, fully aw are of the change which Hobbes had wrought.29
Laslett further observes that the influence of Locke as  a political writer 
arose, "probably because of his philosophical fame"30 while Hobbes, whose goal 
w as to write a  political program, w as read and seen  a s  literature only.31
Pangle establishes a  similar Hobbes-Locke connection. He attributes to 
Hobbes a  radically transformed concept of the "state of nature" from a state of 
innocence prior to the Fall (in the Bible) to a "state of warring". From this 
transformation Hobbes developed his theory of natural rights, social compact, 
and sovereignty. Locke's amelioration to Hobbes's theory m ade it "something 
acceptable to the great body of decent opinion--and something not only 
acceptable but overwhelming in its appeal".32
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Pangle continues on to explain Locke's refutation of Filmer's position in 
Patriarcha by directing the reader to one of Filmer's lesser writings,
Observations on Mr. Hob's Leviathan. In so  doing the issue has becom e a 
question of whether Filmer's scriptural argum ents against the Hobbesian 
conception of man is valid or invalid. Locke proceeds to answ er that Filmer's 
argum ents are invalid, therefore, Hobbes "State of Nature" doctrine stands.
Locke has affirmed Hobbes's stand.33
Similarities between Hobbes and Locke are seen  by David Held to 
include:
Their view on the establishm ent of the political world a s  preceded by the 
existence of individuals endowed with natural rights...their concern to 
derive and explain the very possibility of government... their concern 
about what form legitimate government should take and about the 
conditions for security, peace  and freedom.34
While there is no docum ented evidence that Locke drew directly from
Hobbes, the philosophy and argum ent in Two Treatises supports Hobbes
influence. Locke's writings parallel H obbes's ideas on natural law and universal
equality, the concepts that Thom as Jefferson was to establish a s  the moral
foundations for the United States.
This moral prerogative based  on Hobbesian equity is critical to the
argum ent in support of FIJA. The individual will use the sam e moral prerogative
of equity to determine the law a s  a juror that “the public” (the artificial entity
representing private individuals) used when establishing the law. So, if the
people go so far a s  to establish a government based  on the moral prerogative
that every individual has the sam e rights to the sam e extent, then the artificial
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entity established to administer the legalities of the law can in no way have more
power than the individuals originating that entity when it com es to determining
the moral prerogatives upon which law is based. Mathie observes:
Equity becom es, in the teaching of Hobbes, the basis of a  new political 
order fully realizable in any time and place and even invulnerable against 
all internal causes of dissolution, because  that order is founded on the 
consent of men who are  by nature equal and allows men to pursue a 
commodious existence through their own industry within a  structure 
recognizing that sam e equity.35
The strength of the system  lies in the adherence to the moral prerogative 
by the individual at all times. The entire political order is at stake when 
individuals are  prohibited from acting according to their moral prerogatives at 
any given time. Any attempt by the state  to limit or prohibit the individuals right to 
adhere  to his or her moral prerogative such a s  prohibiting jurors to act according 
to conscience puts the state at risk of dissolution-extrem e language but the 
correct appraisal of what happens during the transition from legitimate to non­
legitimate government.
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CHAPTER FOUR
POLITICS OF THE JURY 
NULLIFICATION 
INSTRUCTION
The focus of the previous chapter was the ethical foundation for 
establishing and maintaining law in a  free society. It w as determined that: 1.) 
citizens implement natural law in their community according to the moral 
prerogatives dictated by equity; 2.) citizens must constantly check on the moral 
authority of the law making sure that the artificial entities (the state  and its 
institutions) designated to administer the law capture the e ssen ce  of the natural 
law in the written law; historically trial by jury is one m eans by which this check 
can be made; 3.) this check is essential to the perpetuation of the free society; 
and 4.) it is unethical for any person to prevent or cau se  to prevent citizens from 
exercising their right to check the moral authority of the law. Therefore, it is an 
unethical practice forjudges and/or the judicial system  to prevent the jury 
nullification instruction or the use  of the concept of jury nullification as  a defense.
The focus of this chapter will be the general policy of the courts not to 
inform jurors of their right to determ ine the law and the political significance of 
this policy to the political order established by the Constitution. The proposed 
corrective m easure of a  "Fully Informed Jury Amendment" (Act) will be examined
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to determine if it is a  viable solution.
Jury Nullification
While it is possible in a republican form of government to have som e
influence in the general lawmaking process through the election of
representatives and the initiative and referendum process, it is only through jury
deliberation that twelve representatives of the community as  a whole have a
chance to assem ble and make a final, binding statem ent as  to what the
community considers lawful in specific circum stances. The power to chose not
to enforce a  law against som eone is referred to as  the power of ‘jury
nullification'. It occurs when the jury determ ines that a  law does not apply to the
case  being tried because  of particular circum stances unique to that c ase  and
finds a  'not guilty1 verdict for the defendant. The jury has in effect checked the
sta te 's  application of the law to the case  and has determined that application to
be inconsistent with the conscience of the community, even though the facts may
be consistent with the artificial law. Jeffrey Abramson, a  professor of politics at
Brandeis University, describes jury nullification in his book, We. the Jury, in the
following manner:
Jury nullification is about the right to set aside the law only to acquit, 
never to convict. As a doctrine, jury nullification poses no threat to the 
accused; it is in fact the time-honored way of permitting juries to leaven 
the law with leniency.1
The second chapter of this thesis recounted historical use  of jury 
nullification through the 1970's and the political trials of the Vietnam W ar protest
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movement. Abramson cites more recent c ase s  where he believes jury 
nullification offers the best possible explanation for the verdict.
The 1994 acquittal of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, accused  of violating a  Michigan 
law that m ade it illegal to assist persons to commit suicide, is the first example 
offered. The law under which he w as prosecuted contained an exemption for the 
acts that w ere done with the intent of relieving pain and suffering even if the 
person performing the acts knew they would hasten death. In post-trial 
interviews jurors indicated a  belief that Dr. Kevorkian acted only to relieve the 
person 's pain and suffering even though he continued the action of holding the 
mask and releasing the carbon monoxide into the patient's (victim's) lungs for 
twenty minutes. Abramson's explanation of the jury's behavior in the Kevorkian 
acquittal is that "they nullified the law insofar a s  it prohibited a  physician from 
assisting a  suicide."2
Next Abramson illustrates jury nullification at work in the 1990 jury 
acquittal and deadlock of W ashington D.C. mayor, Marion Barry. In spite of 
overwhelming evidence in eleven of the thirteen charges--som e of which was 
acquired through an FBI sting operation-- the jury acted with relative leniency 
acquitting or deadlocking on twelve of the thirteen charges, convicting on one 
minor charge in order not to send  the "wrong m essage" about drugs.3
Analyzing the verdicts W ashington columnist William Raspberry 
speculated that:
The jury behaved a s  if W ashington were a 'federal colony1 with a 
black population and a  white power structure. The jury, Raspberry 
thought, bridled at the year-long vendetta of the U.S. Attorney's Office
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and the FBI to bring down a  popular black mayor. They refused to 
convict, beyond that one charge, out of a  sen se  that "occupying forces" 
had pulled out all the stops to topple a  powerful black man for merely 
personal sins.4 T here may have been no legal basis for some jurors' 
refusal to convict on the most serious charges, but Raspberry 
congratulated them for using their nullifying powers to send  a  powerful 
m essage  to federal authorities about the nature of life in W ashington
D.C.5
The last case  Abramson u ses  to illustrate jury nullification is the Iran-
contra trial of Olive North. Clearly instructed by the judge that following orders
did not excuse criminal acts the jury proceeded to acquit North on nine of the
twelve charges, on the grounds that he argued his superiors knew of his false
statem ents to C ongress and his other steps to cover up illegal Contra-funding
activity. The jury did convict him of the three charges w here the evidence
indicated that North acted alone, without authorization from superiors. Post-trial
com m ents by jurors indicate they:
Believed North w as a  ‘scapegoat blamed unfairly for following the 
instructions of his superiors and that is why [we] voted to acquit'6 him of 
the charges of lying’
Abramson concludes:
The jurors' words, a s  well as  the verdict pattern, suggest that they 
decided, against the judge's instructions, that it would be unjust to convict 
som eone for carrying out government policies approved at the very top, 
even if North had to lie to C ongress to carry on.8
In each  of these  c a se s  the jury found unique aspects that prevented them
from applying the law under which the defendants were prosecuted. The written
law did not change, it simply w as determined through jury deliberation that the
law w as not applicable in the situation, so the jury nullified the law in each case.
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The Controversy
While jury nullification is not specifically outlawed in any state, only four
state  constitutions (Maryland, Indiana, Oregon and Georgia) have provided for
judges to instruct jurors sitting on criminal juries of their right to determ ine the
law as  well a s  the facts.9 In Indiana a trial judge may:
Declare the law to the jury but... [it] must not be done in a m anner 
calculated to bind the conscience of jurors and restrict them in their right 
to determ ine the law for them selves.10
And in Maryland a judge instructs:
Members of the Jury, this is a  criminal case  and under the constitution 
and laws of the state  of Maryland in a  criminal case  the jury are  the 
judges of the law a s  well a s  of the facts in the case. So that whatever I 
tell you about the law while it is intended to be helpful to you in reaching a 
just and proper verdict in the case , it is not binding upon you a s  m em bers 
of the jury and you may accept it or reject it. And you may apply the law 
as  you apprehend it to be in the c a se .11
Currently twenty-three s ta tes12 include jury nullification provisions in their 
constitutions under their sections on freedom of speech, especially with respect 
to libel and sedition c a se s .13 However, since no instruction by the judge 
informing jurors of this right is required, the jurors who are often unfamiliar with 
the details of their sta te  constitutions are  unaw are that they have the power to 
exercise this right.
The power of jury nullification exists today only for those jurors educated 
about their right to nullify law and confident enough to follow through with non- 
restrictive deliberations. Uninformed jurors are  led to believe that their 
deliberations must be restricted to coincide with the instructions given by the
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judge, disregarding their own conscience and sen se  of justice. In doing so the
jury becom es nothing more than a fact-finding body.
The jury is led to believe they are a  fact-finding body only through the
rhetoric of jurors' handbooks and courtroom instructions. Exemplified locally, the
handbook of the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, "Jurors'
Handbook: Jury Service....An American Heritage, A Personal Privilege",
requires jurors to sw ear or affirm to the following oath:
You and each  of you do solemnly sw ear (or affirm) that you will 
well and truly try the case  now pending before this Court and a  true 
verdict render, so help you G od?14
This oath is non-restrictive, in that it does not bind the juror to abide by 
the Court's instructions a s  to the law or for that matter upon the evidence 
received into the record by the Court. However, the very next paragraph in the 
jurors' handbook adm onishes the jurors to restrict their deliberations to just that:
This oath is not to be taken lightly or soon forgotten. By 
taking your oath you have given your word that you will reach your 
verdict solely upon evidence received into the record by the Court 
and permitted to remain, and upon the Court's instructions a s  to 
the law. You must not consider any other evidence. You must not 
consider any other instructions. As a  juror, your position will be  as  
important a s  that of the judge in the administration of justice in the 
case  at hand.15
After a  discussion on trial procedures the "Jurors' Handbook" once again
em phasizes the restrictions placed on jury deliberations by the judge's
instructions rather than the jurors' oath:
At the conclusion of the testimony, the next step, and a most 
important one, is taken by the judge. The judge will instruct you on
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the law that applies to the case, and you must apply that law to the 
facts a s  you find them in arriving at your verdict.16
The dilemma of the juror in deciding if he or she is to abide by his oath or
obey the judge's instructions is exacerbated a s  this handbook revisits the great
tradition of jury justice-being  representative of the community's s tan d a rd s-a
tradition that included the right to nullify law.
The verdict resulting from your deliberations will not only determine 
the outcome of the particular case , but it will also influence the 
general caliber of justice rendered in our community. Juries in this 
court have been  doing meritorious service. They have set a  worthy 
standard. It is the responsibility of our judges, of you, and of all 
future jurors to insure the continuance of jury service at that high 
level.17
This dilemma is not unique to the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of 
Nevada. Abramson finds this sam e type of instruction in virtually every 
jurisdiction's handbook in the country.18
The devastation caused  by jurors lacking the nullification instruction can 
be felt by the defendants a s  evidenced by convictions rather than hung juries 
open to retrial; a s  well as  the jurors w hose integrity is compromised a s  they are 
forced to apply the law regardless of their own sen se  of justice and good 
conscience.
In 1980 Scheflin and Van Dyke published "Jury Nullification: The 
Contours of a  Controversy"19, in which they explored the five major argum ents 
against giving the nullification instruction to the jury. The five positions 
represented by these  argum ents have been  labeled by Scheflin and Van Dyke 
as: 1.) the "anti-anarchy" position; 2.) the "nullification-is-unnecessary" position;
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3.) the "nullification-is-unwise" position; 4.) the "dam n-good-reason" position; 
and 5.) the "responsibility-of-the-juror" position. "Contours of a Controversy" 
w as written in the 1980’s; however, proponents for not giving the nullification 
instruction still propose th ese  sam e argum ents today.
The supporters of the "anti-anarchy" position fear jury sovereignty would 
lead to anarchy and law lessness. This fear illustrates a lack of understanding of 
the dispensing power of the ju ry -the  power to "suspend the application of a 
particular law in a particular instance to a particular defendant in the interest of 
conscience and justice".20 The jury's deliberations are  limited to the particular 
c a se  at hand and no legal precedents are set. However, suppose there w ere a 
string of such cases: nullification of the sam e law under many different 
circum stances should indicate to legislators that the law is not representative of 
the conscience of the community.
The "nullification is unnecessary" position is supported by those who 
believe nullification serves no useful function in our legal system b ecause  other 
avenues are available for resolution of situations often decided through jury 
nullification. Scheflin and Van Dyke describe th ese  situations as  ones "where 
the exercise of conscience by the jury is particularly important to protect the 
defendant and to ensure  the fairness of the legal system".21 Such situations 
might be a prosecution brought on by an overzealous prosecutor bringing 
prosecution because  a  prominent or controversial person is involved or because  
of som e personal relationship between the prosecutor and one of the parties, or 
perhaps a  situation in which the trial judge is not able to view the case
objectively, yet does not recuse himself. C ases  with unique circum stances such 
a s  the governm ent being the victim of the crime in a way that m akes it 
impossible for the prosecutor not to prosecute or for the judge to dism iss the 
matter (Cam den 28 Jury); or a case  so highly publicized that prosecution is 
unavoidable, though undesirable, which could more easily resolve itself through 
jury nullification than other channels but the argum ent is that c a se s  such a s  
these  can be handled by requests for dismissal or mistrial. Jury nullification, 
acquitting a  defendant, in c ases  where the government has overstepped 
legitimate bounds in its efforts to bring the defendant to trial (Ruby Ridge and 
W aco come to mind) would be appropriate if requests for dismissal were 
ignored. Hamilton identifies this exact scenario in reference to revenue agents 
and comments:
And a s  to the conduct of the officers of the revenue, the provision 
in favor of trial by jury in criminal c a se s  will afford the security aimed at. 
Willful ab u se s  of a  public authority, to the oppression of the su b je c t, and 
every species of official extortion, are  offenses against the governm ent for 
which the persons who commit them may be indicted and punished 
according to the circum stances of the c ase .22
Finally, the situations presented when the defendant has the sympathy of the
community becau se  of his sufferings or one who has violated an unpopular law
and the community does not condem n his actions are conducive to resolution
through jury nullification. In each of th ese  exam ples alternative channels for
resolution may exist but as  Scheflin and Van Dyke point out "the jury is the only
institution sufficiently free of technical legal constraints to reach a just and
reasoned conclusion."23
53
The "nullification-is-unwise" position holds that nullification is inconsistent 
with dem ocracy since it "allows a single juror the opportunity to overthrow the 
majority will a s  expressed in legislative enactm ents."24 Supporters of this 
position believe unjust laws are  never enacted. They fail to understand the 
strength of the m essage frequent nullification of a  law sends to legislators--"laws 
frequently nullified are probably not reflective of the people's will and the jurors, 
a s  representatives of the people, are saying so".25
The "dam n-good-reason" position originally p resented  by Kadish and 
Kadish in Discretion to Disobey acknowledges the jury's power to nullify is 
legitimized only by a "dam n-good-reason" defined a s  the attainm ent of the end 
for which the jury is committed to serve-justice. Recognizing the value of the 
nullification power to the legal system, Kadish and Kadish argue that juries 
should not be told of their power to nullify ensuring use  in extreme cases  only, 
and limiting the use  of this power overall.
Scheflin's and Van Dyke's opposition to the "damn-good-reason" position 
is four pronged. First, there is no empirical evidence to support the claim that if 
told of their right jurors would wield their power indiscriminately. Second, the 
"dam n-good-reason" position relies on deception. There are  no political 
advan tages to be gained through a  legal system based  on deception. Third, this 
position is internally inconsistent. The proponents of the "dam n-good-reason" 
position want jurors to be informed of their right and power (and even use  them 
on occasion) but they do not want the courts to be the medium by which they are 
informed of their right and power. Finally, nullification instructions would lead to
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more just verdicts b ecause  the nullification instruction would establish standards
on which to base  a  verdict. T hese  standards would be justice and good
conscience rather than the b iases of each juror.
The final argum ent against giving the nullification instruction is the
"responsibility-of-the-juror" position; this position has advocates coming from two
very different perspectives.
Professor G eorge Christie advocates not giving the nullification
instruction to the jury out of fear that the application of the law in question would
be outweighed by the application of a law which required jurors to acquit on the
grounds of good conscience. His fear is that jurors would perceive the
nullification instruction a s  an imperative rather than a  prerogative. He states:
The nullification instruction would be perceived by jurors as  a  command 
that they must acquit 'if they feel strongly enough about the matter'.26
Scheflin and Van Dyke explain Christie's objection to the perceived imperative in
that it rem oves the responsibility for acquitting from the jurors to the law
recognizing the right of nullification.
This is the basis of objection because he believes that the jurors alone 
bear responsibility for acquitting in these  circum stances not the law which 
permits them to get away with doing so .27
Judge Leventhal arrives at the sam e conclusion that nullification 
instructions should not be given to jurors. His reasoning is that the burden of 
taking responsibility for condemnation may overpower the jurors if they know 
they also have the power to free the defendant. Leventhal s e e s  the nullification
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instruction a s  a m eans of personalizing jury deliberations rather than keeping 
the deliberations in the legal arena.
Scheflin and Van Dyke counter-argue against this position with the 
obvious. They state:
Jury service is a heavy responsibility and any attempt to make it 
lighter by passing responsibility to another governmental agency or 
institution violates the concept of the jury. Jury service should be 
understood and treated as  one of the most solemn and meaningful 
obligations a  citizen can be called upon to perform.28
They conclude:
W e do not believe that it is conducive to good citizenship or good 
character to shift the responsibility elsew here rather than standing up for 
what you believe is right. If jurors have reached unpopular verdicts which 
they feel are  nevertheless correct, and if they feel that they have the 
obligation to explain those verdicts, then their explanations should be 
based  upon their recognition of their own role in attempting to do justice 
within the law.29
Political Significance of Not Giving 
a Nullification Instruction
Scheflin's and Van Dyke's counter argum ents to the five opposing
positions stem from their belief that "failure to inform the jury of their right to
nullify seriously w eakens the ‘concept of jury', thereby impermissibly diluting the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights".30 Jury nullification as  a  right is an
enhancem ent of our judicial and political system.
The right of the jury to nullify applications of the law in a  particular 
case  can also be supported on political grounds a s  an essential aspect of 
democratic self-government. It serves to remind governm ents and legal 
professionals that the people are sovereign. It serves to remind the 
community that protection of its liberty and freedom rests in the hands of 
the people.31
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Abramson d iscusses the political restructuring that occurs a s  a result of 
the loss of the nullification right. W eak, fact-finding-only juries resulting from the 
lack of the nullification instruction are  a  m eans by which liberty and self- 
government are  redefined, skewing the justice system into an institution foreign 
to the Constitution upon which our political order w as established.
In the chapter, "Juries and Higher Justice", Abramson parallels the 
decline of the nullification instruction to "basic shifts in the nature of American 
law and democracy".32
Regarding the nature of law, Abramson identifies two fundamental shifts 
requiring w eaker juries. The first shift w as from law "having its source in natural 
reason"33 to the complex law rooted in "the shifting politics of a legislature, not 
necessarily rational, and certainly not traceable to eternal laws of nature".34 To 
quote Abramson:
This basic, overwhelming change in our views about the nature of law 
has carried with it fundamental changes in the nature of the jury. From an 
institution that once presum ed ordinary citizens were com petent to make 
independent judgem ents about the law, the jury changed to reflect the 
assum ption that jurors knew precious little about the law. From an 
institution that valued decentralized justice and local control over law’s 
interpretation, the jury becam e exclusively a fact-finding body, leaving 
judges to enforce a  more uniform and consistent body of legal rules. 
T hese changes were so monumental that it is scarcely an exaggeration to 
say that the jury praised by America's founders no longer survives 
today.35
The second “shift” Abramson d iscusses is the law’s relation to the 
community a s  a result of the growth of heterogeneity and changing concepts of 
democracy. He draws from a study by William Nelson36 indicating that the 
growth of heterogeneity changed the function of the legal system, making it less
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an embodiment of shared values and natural justice and more of a  profession 
designed to referee the compromises and protect the due process of competing 
interest groups.37 This is evidenced in the redefining of the impartial jury (to be 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter) to one that is representational of 
minority dem ographics in the communities, and cross-sectional in that the jury 
must now represent the b iases within the community.
The changing concept of dem ocracy that Abramson describes is the 
geographical shift of the lawmaking process from the decentralized local level to 
the centralized national level. This shift occurred with the transfer of power that 
com es with deciding the law at the local level, at the hands of the citizens, via 
the trial by jury process, to the hands of the judges at the national level. As the 
law developed into a  complex legal system  federal judges complained "that 
juries gave local communities too much control over the law".38 Their argument 
was that:
In a  Republican form of government, law could not rule unless its 
application w as uniform. Juries, arm ed with the right to decide questions 
of law, threatened these  core legal values by giving too volatile an 
expression to popular sovereignty.39
According to Abramson, in order to retain the control of the lawmaking 
power in the central government federal judges changed the political theory of 
self-government based  on natural law (and embodied in trial by jury) to self- 
government based  on artificial law (embodied in due process). In effect this 
theory:
Severed the classical connection betw een liberty and self-government. In 
this new theory, too much popular participation in the judiciary w as a
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decided threat to freedom. Liberty w as a  matter of receiving equal 
protection from the law, not necessarily a  matter of making the law in 
itself.40
The conclusion to this line of reasoning is that judges, not juries, are  best suited 
to determ ine the law.
Abramson continues, turning his discussion to the two inconsistencies 
that em erge when juries are limited to fact finding only. The first inconsistency is 
that this division of labor, fact finding versus determining the law, does not hold 
up well in practice. It seem s that in spite of judicial instruction on the law jurors 
default to their own common sen se  and conscience during deliberations for 
num erous reasons including the lack of understanding of the judges instructions 
on the law and the frustration they encounter when the judge fails to clarify the 
instructions upon request.41
Secondly, the questions of the courtroom do not separa te  nicely into 
law/fact distinctions. Abramson d iscusses how determining fact often 
encom passes complex decisions based  on the nature and degree of the 
defendant's behavior in relation to community standards. He cites exam ples of 
jurors being asked to decide if defendants are  guilty of malice, obscenities, 
negligence or even murder. In each  case  the ju ry -a s  a  matter of so called fact- 
finding-m ust "in fact" determ ine the moral standards of the community, which is, 
in effect determining law !42
Abramson also recognizes the potential which nullification has "for jurors 
to unleash their prejudices in the nam e of conscience".43 Citing a s  exam ples 
"the all white southern juries failing to convict whites charged with murdering
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blacks or civil rights workers of any race"44 during the 1960's, even though the 
verdicts "flew in the face of evidence and law".45 As late a s  1979 jury 
nullification w as the basis of not guilty verdicts for KKK Klansmen accused  of 
gunning down m archers in an anti-Klan rally in G reensboro, North Carolina. 
Again in 1984 th ese  sam e defendants were acquitted in federal court on charges 
of violating federal civil rights laws.46
The G reensboro example of jury nullification is devastating at face value 
b ecau se  it illuminates the dangers of unchecked local b iases upon minority 
groups. The G reensboro case  reeked of racism making it incapable of nullifying 
law becau se  a  morally unjust jury (one that is not lawful or congruent with natural 
law -b iased) could not determ ine the moral standards of the community. 
G reensboro and similar c a se s  exemplify the results that occur when juries stray 
from the standard of justice established through H obbesian equity (do unto 
others a s  you would have done unto you).
The civil rights movement of the 1960's, which the G reensboro c ase  w as 
part of, has  forced judicial review of jury selection procedures in order to ensure  
due process. No longer are local b iases allowed to influence jury selection, thus 
eliminating discriminatory juries such a s  the ones responsible for the 
G reensboro acquittal. As Abramson points out "juries selected through prejudice 
deliberated through prejudice".47
The Suprem e Court h as  moved to rectify the jury selection process in 
order to prevent the discriminatory juries prevalent in the South between 1935 
and 1975. As a  result the nature of an impartial jury has changed from being a
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deliberative body to one that balances the b iases of jurors. This new jury is
described by Abramson as:
one that basically fits the pluralist paradigm of dem ocracy and interest 
group politics...the key to jury verdicts becom es whom the jurors are, not 
what the evidence show s...and the highest aspiration we can have for the 
jury dem ocracy is to represent the perspectives of groups in som e fair 
way, to balance the b iases of jurors and therefore achieve an overall 
impartial jury.48
While the courts can provide rem edies when the trial by jury process repeatedly 
fails to d ispense justice, it cannot, however, furnish the morality necessary  to 
promote justice where none exists; for morality is the originator of law and 
subsequently justice.
Recognizing the inherent benefits and dangers em bodied in the power of 
the nullification right, Abramson concludes that "this is a  risk we must take to 
preserve the  jury a s  a  forum w here ordinary persons gain the power to reconcile 
law and justice in concrete cases".49 To do anything less than acknowledge the 
right to jury nullification would "threaten the integrity of the law"50, and "open the 
chasm  betw een law and the popular beliefs that the jury system  exists to 
prevent".51 The risk of fully informing jurors of their right to nullify must be taken if 
the political o rd e r-b a sed  on law not legalities-as originally established in this 
country is to be restored.
Fully Informed Jury Amendment,
A Remedy
The Fully Informed Jury Association (FIJA) w as founded in the summer of 
1989 a s  a  lobbying interest advocating laws to protect the right of jury
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nullification. Membership in FIJA cuts across political lines and represents 
citizens from all walks of life interested in preserving the trial by jury tradition 
handed down from our forefathers. The common ground these  people share is 
their connection to, support for or recognition of the power of civil disobedience. 
Tax protesters, antilogging environmentalists, advocates for the legalization of 
marijuana, bikers opposed to mandatory helmet laws, those opposed to gun 
control laws (National Rifle Association), and most recently supporters of citizen 
militias, along with others who recognize the source of potential government 
oppression, all turn to the power of jury nullification "as a way of authorizing the 
jury to determ ine whether the disobeyed laws ought to be enforced".52
The organization w as founded after attempts to use  a jury nullification 
defense by ‘Operation Rescue' anti-abortion protesters w as foiled by the 
presiding judges. Jam es Holman, one of the defendants and publisher and 
editor of the "The San Diego Reader" newspaper, placed an ad in that 
new spaper that explained the traditional right of jury nullification and urged the 
jurors to act according to their conscience while deliberating the case. The 
judges in response to the ad instructed the jurors that their duty required them to 
apply the law w hether they agreed with it or not. The ad warned the jurors that 
the judges would indeed take this position and informed them that this instruction 
by the judges w as both unjust and illegal because  the jurors had a historic right 
to disregard the law to uphold a higher justice. The question of trespass  was not 
the only issue the protesters wanted to add ress though their trial. They wanted 
to address the underlying issue of the morality of abortion by claiming the
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immorality of abortion more than justified the trespass. Confused and ill 
informed about their rights the jurors convicted the defendants53. While the 
attempt to use jury nullification as  a defense failed the protesters, the publicity of 
this little known righ t-generated  through this trial-revived interest in the concept 
of jury nullification.
FIJA's goal is to have state  constitutions am ended or other legislation 
adopted to require that judges include in their instructions to the jurors the 
knowledge that they, the jurors, have the right to determine the law as  well as 
the facts in their deliberations.
Eighteen s ta tes54 have had or will have FIJA bills introduced in their 
1995/96 legislative sessions.55 The Fully Informed Jury Association provides 
lobbyists exam ples of appropriate wording for "Fully Informed Jury" legislation. 
O ne such example reads:
W henever government is one of the parties in a trial by jury, the 
court shall inform the jurors that each of them has an inherent right to vote 
on the verdict, in the direction of mercy, according to his own conscience 
and sen se  of justice. Exercise of this right may include jury consideration 
of the defendant's motives and circumstances, degree of harm done, and 
evaluation of the law itself. Failure to so  inform the jury is grounds for 
mistrial and another trial by jury.56 (S ee Appendix)
Scheflin, Van Dyke and Abramson present good evidence to support
their positions that the consequences of not fully informing jurors of their right to
determ ine both law and fact are  both societal and political-meaning that they
affect the m anner by which society influences the political processes. Scheflin's
and Van Dyke's argum ents illustrate that not giving the nullification instruction to
the jurors seriously dam ages the historical concept of jury upon which our
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judicial system  operates and jeopardizes the protection provided to the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Abramson's argum ent pointedly traces the 
erosion of law and justice in our communities to the creation of juries empowered 
for fact-finding only, juries limited by the judges instruction to decide the facts 
based  on the evidence only. The resulting judicial system  is no longer centered 
in the conscience of the community but in policy m anuals removed from the 
reach of ordinary citizens. In each  case  the individuals who once acted a s  a 
moral check on the authority of the written law were removed from the process.
Is it possible to restore the system  of law and justice created by our 
forefathers and held in such high esteem  through the years?  I believe such 
restoration is possible and that a  Fully Informed Jury Amendment is a step  in the 
right direction.
FIJA legislation would definitely restore the historical concept of trial by 
jury in the country. Requiring the courts to charge the jury with the duty of 
determining the law and the fact in accordance with a sen se  of conscience and 
justice reinstates the type of deliberations that were at one time customary.
Such an am endm ent would eliminate for jurors, already knowledgeable about 
their right to deliberate without limits, the dilemma presented  when the court 
limits jury deliberations to fact- finding only.
FIJA legislation would add ress  Scheflin's and Van Dyke's concern about 
protecting a  defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to an impartial jury by requiring 
that the courts enforce due process by informing jurors of their right to vote 
according to their conscience and sen se  of justice and not merely act a s  a
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rubber stam p for the judge. Unless a jury is able to deliberate about the law and 
its application it cannot be identified a s  an impartial jury. To leave the decisions 
about the law and its application to the administrators of the courts compromises 
the system of justice which trial by jury is supposed  to provide-nam ely, a  system 
of justice in which the originators of the law are  also the enforcers of law.
FIJA legislation is consistent with both 'lawfulness' and 'legalism', the 
natural and artificial aspec ts  of our judicial system. ‘Legalists’ those who 
advocate adhering to artificial law, must advocate the nullification instruction if 
due process, the result of legalism, is to be provided. Nullification is the power 
by which juries retain their impartiality. Provided for in the Constitution an 
impartial jury is a  requirem ent that must be rendered so a s  not to violate the 
written law. ‘Lawyers', those favoring law determ ined at the local level, must 
advocate the instruction for jury nullification for it is the premise upon which law 
based  on the conscience of the community is founded. Both ‘legalists’ and 
'lawyers' realize it is the people who originate the law that must give their final 
approval that this is in fact the situation in which the law in question applies.
FIJA legislation would ensure that all citizens serving a s  jurors would 
have a  common reference point from which to start their deliberations--that point 
being the ethical foundation of the established law in their community. The 
transition of justice based  on law to justice based  on due process as  described 
by Abramson would be reversed over time. As jury nullification rights are 
restored, citizens would again be responsible for establishing and maintaining
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law in their communities--the original prem ise upon which law in our 
communities is founded.
FIJA legislation does not exist without restrictions, however. As 
implemented in Indiana the following restrictions apply. "The jury's prerogative 
lies with questions of the application of the law. The question of the law's 
constitutionality resides with the courts."57 The Indiana Suprem e Court has 
rejected the jury's power to create new crimes although no jury has ever 
attem pted to do so. Juries cannot find a  defendant guilty of a crime not charged; 
however, they may find a defendant guilty of a  lesser crime than charged if all 
the elem ents of that lesser offense are  present in the greater charge. Trial 
judges in Indiana cannot m andate a verdict through instructions to jurors (i.e. 
that the p resence  of certain evidence m andates a guilty verd ict).58
As of the writing of Scheflin's and Van Dykes's article there has been no 
evidence in the Indiana courts indicating that judges there are  dissatisfied with 
giving the nullification instruction. At that time there was also no evidence 
indicating juries were acquitting more often due to the instruction.59
In 1975 Maryland circuit judges w ere surveyed by Prof. Gary Jacobsohn 
to determ ine their views on the Maryland nullification instruction. Out of the 81 
justices surveyed 44 responded. The majority of these  44 stated  that the 
nullification instruction had "not been  a  significant factor in shaping the output of 
the trial process".60 Other responses included three claiming the instruction 
frequently affected the outcome, and another eight who determ ined the outcome 
w as only occasionally affected by the instruction.61
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Overall only eight of the 44 judges responding to the survey felt 
negatively about the nullification instruction. The others responded in a fashion 
that lead Jacobsohn to believe that they thought the instruction should be 
retained.
Asked specifically about the jury nullification instruction fourteen of the 
respondents valued it b ecause  it gave them insight into the "conscience of the 
community". The twenty-two who disapproved of this jury power did so because  
they felt it infringed on the judicial domain rather than usurping power from the 
legislative domain.62
W hether pronounced as  a right a s  it is in Indiana, Maryland and several 
other states, or operating incognito through the guise of educated jurors, jury 
nullification is alive and well. In light of the ethical and political argum ents in 
favor of jury nullification presented in this chapter I believe FIJA legislation ought 
to be incorporated into our justice system legally recognizing a part of our 
unique American heritage that provides the citizens an opportunity to act as  
moral agents checking the activity of the government upon its citizens.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this paper the trial by jury process has been  shown to hold a critical 
position in the political a rena a s  the institution guaranteeing the moral authority 
of the law and therefore the final check on any activity of the government against 
its citizens. The jury's right to determ ine the applicability of law a s  well as  the 
facts is what empowers the jury to act a s  the moral check on government activity. 
This power to determ ine that the law does not apply in any given case  is known 
a s  "jury nullification". It has been  proven historically (Chapter 2) and 
contem porary (Chapter 4) that this power of nullification does work a s  a moral 
check on government activity keeping it in line with what the conscience of the 
community determ ines to be lawful.
C hapter three established individual citizens acting in community a s  the 
originators of the law and a s  such the only moral authority capable of 
determining equity and dispensing justice. This is established through the use  
of Hobbes' definition of the concepts “equity” and “justice” a s  applied to the dual 
role of the trial by jury process. Disallowing jurors knowledge of their right to 
exercise their power of jury nullification is shown to be an inequitable and 
therefore an unethical practice.
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Chapter four explains how the integrity of our judicial system  is 
compromised when citizens are not fully informed of their power a s  jurors to 
nullify law. The transition from the theory of justice established by our founding 
fathers to the theory of justice practiced today is paralleled with the decline of 
jury rights leading to the conclusion that jurors must be informed of their power 
to nullify if we a s  citizens are to maintain our positions as  originator of the law 
and moral agents in the political process. The controversial issue is whether the 
courts should be required to inform jurors of their power through a Fully Informed 
Jury Amendment or if jurors are to acquire this information from other sources.
This last chapter will state  my conclusions, provide a recommendation on 
how to achieve the goal set forth in the conclusion along with a rationale for the 
recommendation.
Conclusions
It is the position of this thesis that Fully Informed Jury legislation should 
be enacted for the following reasons:
1. A Fully Informed Jury Amendment would restore the lawmaking 
process, designed to check the governm ent's power, to the hands of its 
(the government's) moral agents, the people.
2. A Fully Informed Jury Amendment would acknowledge a s  a  right 
a  power already held by jurors and used in many case s  maintaining 
integrity within our system  of justice.
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3. A Fully Informed Jury Amendment would enforce a  jury process
a s  guaranteed in Article III of the Constitution and the Sixth, Seventh and
Fourteenth Amendments. Quoted respectively:
The trial of all crimes, except in c ase s  of impeachment, shall 
be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said 
crime shall have been committed...1
The accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury...2
The right to trial by jury shall be preserved...3
Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.4
4. A Fully Informed Jury Amendment would eliminate any 
assum ption that all citizens have acquired the knowledge necessary  to be 
"Fully Informed Jurors" through formal education or informal channels.
Recommendations 
The following recom m endations are  being m ade in order to promote the 
enactm ent of Fully Informed Jury Legislation:
Recommendation I:
The first recommendation is that support for this legislation be 
provided by members of the major political parties and judicial 
policy makers.
Rationale I:
Third party support for FIJA legislation has proven to be unsuccessful. To 
date no FIJA legislation has been  introduced in the Nevada legislature.
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However, FIJA activists are busy in the state  of Nevada distributing 
literature and discussing the issue of jury nullification a s  an individual 
right. Perhaps a s  citizens becom e aw are of the power being denied 
them, the dem and for this legislation will increase.
Recommendation II:
The second recommendation is educating citizens to be fully 
informed jurors. Citizenship must be taught as a whole, in its own 
right, with its own curriculum, and reinforced through history, 
literature and government. Students must be prepared to accept the 
responsibility of the moral agency that comes with citizenship. The 
mainstream media and other informal channels of education through 
which citizens acquire information and gain knowledge need to 
acknowledge the nullification power of the jury. This American 
tradition needs to be discussed over the airwaves, on television, and 
in print. The media needs to demonstrate jury nullification as a 
safeguard to liberty and an acceptable means of resolving jury 
deliberations. Educating for citizenship would require changes in 
the formal educational system to provide the essential information 
students need in order to acquire the knowledge necessary to be 
empowered as "fully informed jurors".
Rationale II:
The need to change the method of educating for citizenship is
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evidenced by the declining proficiency scores of our nations youth. "The 
Civics Report Card"5, is a  product of the National A ssessm ent of 
Educational Progress (NAEP), a congressionally m andated project 
established in 1969 to obtain data on the educational achievem ent of 
American students. It has  surveyed civics education in 1976, 1982 and 
most recently 1988. The study summarizes findings from two 
assessm en ts  made. The first is an assessm en t of students age  thirteen 
and seventeen  years old.. The second is an assessm en t of students in 
fourth, eighth, and twelfth grade. Areas of assessm en t were: their 
recognition of the existence of civic life; their understanding of the nature 
of political institutions and the relationship betw een citizen and 
government; their understanding of specific government structures and 
functions; and their understanding of the variety of political institutions 
and p rocesses.6 The results indicated a significant decline in civics 
proficiency over the twelve year period (1979-1988).
Performance results indicative of the decline include: the 
proficiency level of the seven teen  year old students declined significantly 
from the previous years-in terestingly  though the proficiency level of the 
thirteen year olds rem ained the same; the perform ance gap between the 
White, Black and Hispanic thirteen year olds narrowed due to improved 
perform ance among the Black and Hispanic students. At age  seventeen 
the narrowing of this gap w as the result of a  decline in the performance of 
the W hite students; decline occurred in both advantaged and
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disadvantaged urban schools for the seventeen  year old students while 
economic factors did not influence the perform ance of the thirteen year 
olds; gender w as a  factor in the perform ance of the thirteen year olds 
with fem ales improving significantly, although at ag e  seventeen gender 
w as not a significant influence; and proficiency for seventeen year olds in 
the western United S ta tes declined more significantly than in either the 
Northeast or Central regions and only slightly worse than in the 
Southeast.7
T hese trends were determined after identical assessm en ts  were 
administered every fourth year over the twelve year period in order to 
"allow the NAEP to examine changes across time in the civic knowledge 
of thirteen and seven teen  year olds".8 The results were analyzed using 
item response theory (IRT) technology, allowing the performance data to 
be reported on a  single proficiency scale, ranging from 0 to 100. The 
information w as analyzed to determine national trends as  well a s  trends 
within subpopulations such a s  race and ethnicity, size and type of 
community, gender, and geographical region. The study does not 
postulate about the findings.
Instructional findings indicate that 89% of eighth graders reported 
having studied civics or government since fifth grade, and 93% of the 
twelfth graders reported having taken at least one course in this subject in 
high school. The students reported studying a  variety of civic subjects 
mostly through reading a  textbook. It w as found that students who
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reported som e study in the subject a rea  dem onstrated a higher 
proficiency on the average than students who did not study the subject. 
Less than 8 per cent (7.9) of students reported no American Government 
or Civics instruction in high school. The average proficiency level for 
these  student w as recorded at 277.3 in comparison to the 297.9 average 
proficiency level the 39.9 per cent of high school students who reported 
more than one year of American Government or Civics instruction scored. 
It w as also  found that the more time spent in the instruction of the social 
studies curriculum and the more diverse the activities the higher the 
proficiency level on the assessm ent.
Perusing the assessm en t items I found one item referenced to jury 
responsibility. The item w as to determ ine if the student knew the "duty of 
the jury is to determine if guilty"9. Eighty-seven percent of those surveyed 
responded correctly. My assum ption is that those responding did so with 
an affirmative answ er which implies the duty of a jury is limited to fact­
finding. If the item w as to survey knowledge of the nullification power of 
the jury, the item should have read ‘duty of jury to determ ine justice 
application of the law' rather than;"determine if guilty".
Considering this decline in civics proficiency, it is evident that the 
formal educational process in place is not adequately preparing students 
for their role a s  citizens and jurors. Understanding the power of the jury is 
an integral part of citizenship. Since the schools are  not adequately 
preparing students for citizenship, at least not to the degree as  in the
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past, their status a s  informed jurors is endangered  if not already extinct.
It is also evident from this decline in proficiency that the informal 
educational channels that opponents of a nullification instruction claim to 
be the citizens' source of information and knowledge of their power a s  a 
juror are not adequate. If th ese  sources w ere supplem enting the 
information lacking in the formal educational process the decline in 
proficiency would not be significant.
A civics curriculum which incorporates historical background, 
philosophical justification, critical thinking and provides for experience in the 
civics arena needs to be designed a s  a replacem ent for what is now offered.
This study reinforces my recommendation that citizenship be taught as  
whole, in its own right, with its own curriculum, and reinforced through 
government, history and literature resulting in an understanding of the moral 
authority citizens have over their government and the m eans by which this moral 
authority is accessed  through the fully informed trial by jury process.
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ENDNOTES
1. "Constitution of the United States" as  cited in Edward Conrad Smith 
and Harold J. Spaeth ed. The Constitution of the United
S tates, (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1987), 51
2. Ibid., 55
3. Ibid., 56
4. Ibid., 58
5. National Assessm ent of Educational Progress, The Civics Report 
Card, (Princeton: National Assessm ent of Educational 
Progress, Educational Testing Service, 1990)
6. Ibid., 8
7. Ibid., 8-9
8. Ibid., 12
9. Ibid., 108
A P P E N D I X
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSED FIJA AMENDMENT
W henever governm ent is one of the parties in a trial by jury, the court 
shall inform the jurors that each  of them has an inherent right to vote on the 
verdict, in the direction of mercy, according to his own conscience and sen se  of 
justice.
The court shall therefore allow any party to the trial to present to the jury, 
for its consideration, evidence and testimony relating to the motives and 
circum stances of the defendant and the extent to which he actually harmed 
another person. Any party to the trial may also  present to the jury argum ents 
regarding the spirit, intent, merits and constitutionality of the law itself and its 
applicability to the c ase  at hand.
Trial jurors shall acknowledge by oath that they understand this right, and 
no potential juror may be disqualified from serving on a jury for expressing a 
willingness to consider such testimony or evidence, to evaluate the law or it 
application, or to vote on the verdict according to conscience.
(2) Before the jury hears a case, and again before jury deliberation 
begins, the court shall inform the jurors of their rights in th ese  words:
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"As jurors, your first responsibility is to decide w hether the defendant has 
broken the law. If you determine that the evidence will support a finding of guilt 
or liability a s  charged, you may so  find.
"However, if so finding would violate you conscience or sen se  of justice, 
you may exercise you right to consider, in addition to other evidence and 
testimony presented, (a) the motives and the circum stances of the defendant; (b) 
the extent to which the defendant's actions actually dam aged the rights of 
another person; and (c) the merits of the law itself, and the wisdom of applying it 
to the defendant in the case  before you.
"Such considerations may be used  a s  a basis for finding a  criminal 
defendant not guilty, or guilty of a  lesser offense which is wholly contained in the 
original charge. In a civil case, such considerations may be used a s  a  basis for 
finding the defendant not liable, or liable for less than the am ount of dam ages 
claimed by the plaintiff.
"In no case  may you escala te  the charges against a criminal defendant, or 
increase the award to be paid by a  civil defendant beyond the value of the 
dam ages claimed in the original complaint m ade by the plaintiff.
"The court cautions that with the exercise of your right to vote according 
to your own sen se  of right and wrong, instead of strictly according to the law, 
com es full personal, moral accountability for the verdict you bring in, both to 
yourself and to your community."
(3) Failure to so  inform the jury, to hear the jurors' acknowledgment by 
oath that they understand the information given them, or any other infraction of 
the above rules of procedure is grounds for mistrial and another jury trial.
Taken from "What is "FIJA"?, “FIJA” Jury Power Information Kit. Fully 
Informed Jury Association, (Helmville, MT) 2
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